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Abstract 
It is hypothesized that the u.s.  Export  Enhancement  Program  (EEP) 
has  had  a  role in increased u.s.  imports of Canadian wheat.  Using 
a  set of world wheat models  that differentiate wheat  according to 
class  and  source,  several  conclusions  concerning  the  role  of  EEP 
are  reached.  Over  the period  1986-1993,  EEP  has  been  accountable 
for  40  to  48  percent  of  the  yearly  growth  in  U. s.  imports  of 
Canadian wheat.  EEP subsidies in 1991/92 to China and Brazil caused 
significant  diversion  of  Canadian  wheat  that  would  have  been 
destined for those markets instead to the u.s.  market.  Further,  it 
is  argued  that  a  quota  on  imports  is  not  likely  to  have  price-
enhancing effects for u.s.  wheat. 
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February  1995 u.s.  Imports  of Canadian  Wheat: 
Estimating  the Effect of the u.s. 
Export  Enhancement  Program 
Ever  since  the  implementation  of  the  united states  - Canada  Free 
Trade  Agreement  (FTA),  increasing yearly u.s.  imports  of Canadian 
wheat  have  been  a  major  concern  of u.s.  wheat  interests.  In July 
1994  International  Trade  Commission  (ITC)  commissioners  decided 
that  the  wheat  imports  were  affecting  the  u.s.  wheat  price  and 
income  support  program's  costs  and  markets.  They  recommended 
restricting wheat  imports through either an  import quota,  tariff-
rate quota,  or tariffs. After negotiations, the Canadians agreed to 
limit exports through the Canadian Wheat  Board  (CWB)  to the united 
states to 1.5 million metric  tons  (mmt)  for  one  year starting  12 
September  1994,  and  to  the  formation  of  a  j oint  commission  on 
grains  to  examine  grain  marketing  and  support  systems  in  each 
country. 
There  has  been  no  widely  agreed  upon  explanation  as  to  why  u.s. 
imports  of  Canadian  wheat  have  been  trending  upward .  secretive 
export  pricing  practices  of  the  CWB  and  the  Western  Grain  # 
Transportation Act rail subsidies have  been  suspected as  factors. 
Less  suspected,  at least among  u.s.  wheat  interests,  has  been the 
role  played  by  U. s.  wheat  export  subsidies,  especially  Export 
Enhancement  Program  (EEP)  bonuses made to assist the sales of u.s. 
wheat  in world markets. 
There are two aspects to the way that the EEP  has affected Canada. 
Both  act  to  widen  wheat  price  differentials  between  u. s.  and 
Canadian  wheats,  leading to  increased u.s.  purchases  of  Canadian 
wheat.  The first is related to the way that the  CWB  sets the price 
at  which  it  acquires  wheat  from  producers.  This  mechanism  is 
described  below.  The  second  is  the  focus  of  this  report.  It 
emphasizes  that  the  United  states  and  Canada  compete  in  both 
domestic  and  foreign markets.  A  program that shifts u.s.  wheat to 
foreign markets  increases domestic acquisition costs while at the 
same  time  displacing  Canadian  wheat  from  foreign  markets.  Given 
close  geographical  proximity,  increased  shipments  to  the  united 
states might  be  reasonably expected. 
Several  issues  could  influence  the  magnitude  of  this  effect, 
however.  The  first  is the  degree  to  which  the  United  States  has 
targeted  EEP  bonuses.  Subsidizing  sales  to  markets  shared  with 
Canada  would  have  a  displacement  potential.  The  second  is  the 
degree  to  which  Canadian  wheat  substitutes  for  U. S  wheat,  both 
domestically  and  internationally.  The  greater  is  the 
substitutability  internationally,  the  more  likely  it that  U. s. 
wheat  has  had  a  displacement  effect.  Also,  the  greater  is  the 
substitutability  domestically,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  u.s. 
flour  millers  could  SUbstitute  Canadian  wheat  for  a  more  costly 
u.s.  product. 
This  paper  investigates  the  role  of  the  EEP  in  accounting  for increased u.s.  imports  of  Canadian  wheat.  It uses  a  set of  world 
wheat  models  that  explicitly  incorporate  product  differentiation 
among  wheat  classes  and  source  countries.  These  models  were 
constructed based  on  information  on  major  import markets  gathered 
as  part  of  the  Grain  Quality  surveys  conducted  by  the  Economic 
Research  Service  (ERS)  of  the  U. S.  Department  of  Agriculture 
(USDA).  These models  were  constructed covering the July-June crop 
years  from  July  1986  through  June  1993.  The  EEP  has  been  an 
actively used program throughout this period.  The models allow for 
targeting  of  EEP  bonuses  to  specific  importers,  and  allows 
consideration of the  EEP  as  an  in-kind subsidy program. 
Three specific questions are addressed: 
o  What  percentage  of  the  growth  of  U. S.  wheat  imports  from 
Canada  could  be  reasonably  attributed  to  the  EEP  over  this 
1986-1993  period? 
o  In what years was the EEP particularly important in accounting 
for  increased Canadian wheat  imports?  Why? 
o  Given actual  levels and  targeting of  EEP  bonuses,  what would  ~ 
have  been  the  effect  in  1992/93  (the  most  recent  period 
covered by one of the models)  of restricting Canadian  imports 
to  levels  of  1989/90?  Specifically,  would  U.S.  prices  have 
been  significantly  different  than  what  they  were  if 
restrictions  had  been  in  place?  What  would  have  been  the 
implication for the costs of the U.S.  wheat price and  income 
support program,  upon which the recent ITC decision was based? 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  looks  more 
closely at U.S.  wheat  import trends and how  the EEP  may  affect the 
CWB' s  acquisition  cost  of  wheat  from  producers.  The  following 
section describes the modeling approach used for the analysis.  The 
last  sections  answer  the  questions  posed  above.  A  short  summary 
follows. 
u.s.  Wheat  Import  Trends  and  CWB  pricing Mechanisms 
The wheat dispute between the united States and Canada is based on 
the  less-than-transparent wheat  pricing policies  of  the  Canadian 
Wheat  Board  (CWB)  and  Canada's  Western  Grain  Transportation  Act 
(WGTA)  rail  transport  subsidy.  The  CWB  has  sole  authority  for 
international and intraprovincial trade of Canadian wheat  from the 
western  provinces.  The  CWB  sets  producer  payments,  regulate 
deliveries  through  quotas  and  contracts,  and  organizes  wheat 
handling and transportation. Based on anecdotal evidence,  and aided 
by  the  fact  that  the  CWB  does  not  publish  prices  for  individual 
sales,  U.S.  wheat  producers  and  traders  have  maintained  the  CWB 
2 subsidizes wheat exports to the determent of u.s. wheat sales,  both 
domestically and  internationally. 
The  focus  of  the  dispute  more  recently  has  been  the  growth  of 
Canadian wheat  exports to the united states,  especially since the 
implementation of FTA.  Figure 1  shows U.S.  wheat imports broken out 
between  durum  and  non-durum  wheats  from  Canada  from  July  1986 
through  June  1993.  Total  wheat  imports  have  trended  upward  about 
Fiqure  1 
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150  thousand metric tons per year over this period.  The  growth  in 
durum  has  been very  steady at  54  thousand metric  tons,  while  the 
growth of non-durum has been larger - 97  thousand metric tons - but 
has  grown especially large only since 1990. 
One  way  the EEP  can affect the  incentive to  import  Canadian wheat 
is  through  the  way  CWB  bases  its  acquisition  payment  made  to 
producers  for wheat.  CWB  pegs  its initial payment  to producers at 
world wheat prices that· incorporate the effect of export subsidies. 
This  amount  per unit is about  80  percent of the world price,  with 
minor  adjustments  made  for  handling  expenses.  This  payment 
constitutes the  CWB  wheat  acquisition price. 
3 The  CWB  goal  is  to  price  the  grain  sufficiently  low  so  that 
proceeds  from  CWB  sales will cover the sum of the initial payments 
to  producers.  If  the  CWB  runs  a  deficit,  the  Canadian  federal 
government  must  make  reimbursement  to  cover  it.  In  effect,  this 
federal  expenditure is an  export subsidy. 
An  effective EEP  will  introduce  a  price wedge  separating the u.s. 
domestic  price  from  the  world  price.  According  to  the  mechanism 
described  above,  the  Canadian  producer  price  will  be  much  lower 
than the comparable u.s. producer price. Additionally, geographical 
proximity  implies  that transport costs  from  Canada  to  the  United 
states are  likely  lower  than  costs  to most  other export markets. 
These two factors imply that large price differentials likely exist 
that  would  make  the  purchase  of  Canadian  wheat  by  U. s.  flour 
millers attractive.  . 
Although this explanation seems plausible,  its effect has not been 
systematically quantified.  The  remainder of this paper presents an 
analysis  that  quantifies  the  effect  of  EEP.  Although  the  CWB' s 
pricing procedure is not explicitly modeled,  a  modeling  mechanism 
that approximates its effect is used. 
Modeling  Approach 
Previous  world  wheat  models,  with  few  exceptions  (Hjort,  1988), 
analyze  the  competition  among  exporters  facing  a  market  of 
homogenous quality.  Even the Armington assumptions differentiate a 
product by its country of origin, with no explicit recognition that 
quality requirements are not necessarily related to supply sources. 
The  model  constructed  for  this  analysis  recognizes  that 
competitiveness  among  exporters  is largely determined  by  the end-
use  requirements  of wheat  product  demand  and the policy structure 
of the  importing country. 
Three-stage Theory of Wheat  Import  Demand 
Wheat  import  demand  is modeled  as  a  three-stage  decision  process 
(fig.2). In the first stage, the importer determines how much wheat 
needs to be imported to satisfy domestic end-use demand  for wheat. 
This wheat is referred to as "standard-quality wheat" and possesses 
characteristics particular to each  importing country's needs.  For 
the next two stages,  some level of sUbstitution among wheat classes 
and  suppliers  is  assumed  to  occur.  This  sUbstitution  allows 
aggregation  across  characteristics  to  obtain  a  quality  standard 
that  can  satisfy  imports  of  different  classes  from  different 
suppliers of wheat.  The  importing agent can thereby determine what 
classes  of  wheat  will  sa":  C sfy  excess  demands,  given  rates  of 
SUbstitution between  "stanc:.  .... rd-quality wheat"  and  imported wheat. 
In  the  second  stage,  the  importer  determines  what  c1ass(es)  of 
4 Figure  2 
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wheat  will  optimally  satisfy  wheat  import  demand  which  is 
determined  in  the  first  stage.  The  goal  of  the  importer  is  to 
minimize  the  costs  of  fulfilling the  aggregate  demand  for  wheat. 
This goal holds for both private and state traders.  The solution to 
the  cost  minimization  problem  shows  the  mix  of  wheats  that  will 
satisfy  demand  for  wheat-quality  characteristics.  In  the  third  ~ 
stage,  the importer determines  from which supplier to purchase the 
class  of  wheat  identified  in  the  second  stage.  Factors  that 
influence supplier-specific quality characteristics are potentially 
many,  but  in  particular  they  include  spatial/timing 
characteristics;  political  and  trade  ties;  and  policy  goals, 
including supply assurance and diversification objectives. 
Making  the Model  operational 
The  world  wheat  model  was  built  in  the  static  World  Policy 
simulation  (SWOPSIM)  modeling  framework,  modified  to  incorporate 
the three-stage wheat import demand structure.  SWOPSIM  is a  static, 
partial  equilibrium,  nonspatial  modeling  framework  (Roningen, 
Sullivan,  and Dixit,  1991).  Supply and demand are functions of own-
and cross-prices.  Trade  is the difference between domestic  supply 
and  demand.  Domestic  incentive  prices  depend  on  the  level  of 
consumer  and  producer  support  and  on  world  prices  denominated  in 
local currency. Price transmission elasticities regulate the extent 
to  which  domestic  prices  change  when  world  prices  change.  World 
markets clear when net trade of a  commodity across all regions sums 
to zero. 
Because  the  SWOPSIM  structure  assumes  product  homogeneity,  the 
framework  must  be  modified  to  make  the  modeling  framework 
consistent with  the  theory  of differentiated wheat  demand.  Seven 
types  of wheat  ar~ in the model.  six'of the wheats  are  identified 
with the country-source of production:  the United States,  Canada, 
the EC,  Australia, Argentina,  and Saudi Arabia.  The seventh type is 
a  generic wheat  category comprising wheat  produced elsewhere. 
5 Armington's  methodology  is  employed  to calculate  own- and  cross-
price elasticities for the wheat types,  according to the procedures 
described  in  table  1.  Necessary  elements  for  setting  the  demand 
elasticity  parameters  are  an  own-price  elasticity  of  demand  for 
standard-quality  wheat  (stage  1),  elasticities  of  sUbstitution 
corresponding to wheat classes  (a,  stage 2)  and to wheat suppliers 
of particular classes  (ai'  stage 3),  and  consumption and/or  import 
shares. 
The  first-stage  demand  elasticities,  along  with  supply  and  price 
transmission elasticities, are shown in table 2. These elasticities 
are  based  on  those  used  in  ERS' s  trade  liberalization  studies 
(Sullivan and  others,  1992;  and  Sullivan,  1990). 
The elasticities of substitution were inferred from a  review of the 
Grain  Quality  surveys.  The  countries  included  in  the  study  were 
chosen on the basis of their share of purchases on the world wheat 
market  (58  percent of  1992  imports  and  63  percent of U.S.  sales), 
and  to yield a  representative view of worldwide  demand  for wheat. 
These countries are  separated out  in table 2. 
Table 3  shows how wheat is classified in each of the countries,  the  ~ 
between-class  sUbstitution elasticities,  the  principal  suppliers 
within  wheat  classes,  and  the  within-class  substitution 
elasticities.  For  most  countries  in the  model,  the  between-class 
elasticities are  estimated to be  low  (usually  about  0.50),  while 
the between-supplier elasticities tend to be higher  (usually about 
3.00).  For the countries and regions not surveyed, historical wheat 
import  and  consumption  patterns  are  used  to  construct  the  wheat 
class categories  (table 4).  An  appendix to this report  (available 
from  the  author)  details  wheat  import  demand  in  each  of  the 
importing  countries  or  regions,  implications  for  U.S.  wheat 
competitiveness,  and  selection of parameter values. 
Modelinq  the  Export  Enhancement  Proqram 
Over  the July-June marketing  years  1986/87  through  1992/93,  more 
than  $3.7  billion  was  expended  on  the  EEP.  Figure  3  shows  the 
distribution of expenditures  over the 7-year time  frame.  Figure  3 
reveals  that the  highest  yearly  expenditures  occurred  in  1987/88 
and 1991/92.  Expenditures dipped during the middle years of 1988/89 
and  1989/90  due to tighter worldwide  wheat  supply conditions. 
The  EEP  is a  subsidy program targeted to specific importers.  Table 
5  presents the yearly average unit subsidy amounts  that importers 
in  the  model  received.  until  November  1991,  EEP  subsidies  were 
given to exporters in tne form of commodity certificates that could 
either be sold or exchanged for commodities  owned by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation  (CCC).  This operation, called an in-kind subsidy 
program,  presents analytical problems.  Although  export volume 
6 Table  1  -- Three-staqe  demand  for wheat 
Stage  1:  Decision to  import wheat 
Define:  'I  Demand  elasticity for  standard-quality wheat 
Stage  2:  Choice  of wheat class 




Elasticity of substitution between wheat  classes 
Own-price  demand elasticity of class  i  wheat 
Cross-price  demand elasticity of class  i  wheat,  with respect  to class h  wheat 
Expenditure  share of class h  wheat  imports 
Own-price  demand  elasticity of class  i  wheat: 
f}ii  = - (l-SJ *0  +  Si*f) 
Cross-price  demand  elasticity of class  i  wheat: 
f} ih = S h * (0  +  f}) 
Stage  3:  Choice  of supplier 
Define:  °i 
'Ii,jj 
'I i.  jm 
Si,m 
Elasticity of substitution between suppliers of class  i  wheat 
Own-price  demand  elasticity of class  i  wheat  from  exporter  j 
Cross-price  demand  elasticity of class  i  wheat  from  exporter j, with respect  to 
exporter m 
Expenditure  share of class  i  wheat  imports  from  supplier m 
f} ... = -(l-S  ..  )*0.  +  S·  .*n .. 
~.JJ  ~,J  ~  ~.J  'Il~  , 
f}i.jm = Si.m* (Oi  +  f}iJ 
f}i.jm  =  Sh.m*f}ih where h¢i 
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Other  importers: 


















Mexico,  Central America  0.55 
Other  South America  0.38 
Other Western Europe  0.80 
Eastern Europe  0.25 
Other North Africa  0.30 
Other  Sub-Saharan Africa  0.50 
Other  Near  East  0.30 
Other  Far East  0.40 
Rest of World 
- - Not  applicable. 
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0.70 Table  3  -- Elasticities of sUbstitution:  Surveyed  importers 
Importer  Wheat  class  Between-class  Suppliers  1  Within-class 
substitution  substitution 
elasticity  elasticity 
Venezuela  Hard  0.5  US-CN  3.0 
Soft  US-AR-EC-SA  3.0 
Brazil  Preferred  0.5  DM-AR  1.0 
Hard  CN-US  3.0 
Italy  EC  0.5  DM-Other  EC 
Hard  US-CN-SA  3.0 
Durum  CN-US  0.5 
Former  Soviet  Generic  DM-US-CN-EC-AR-AU  3.0 
Union 
Morocco  Durum  1.0  DM 
CODmon  DM-Foreign  3.0 
Foreign:US-EC-CN  4.0 
Tunisia  Durum  0.5  DM-EC-US-CN  4.0 
CODmon  US-EC-DM  4.0 
Ghana  Hard  0.5  CN-US  4.0 
Soft  EC 
Togo  Hard  1.0  US-CN  2.0 
Soft  EC 
Egypt  Domestic  3.0  DM 
Foreign  AU-Other 
Australian  0.5  AU 
Other  US-EC-SA-CN  3.0 
Yemen  Generic  AU-EC-US-DM-CN  4.0 
Pakistan  Domestic  0.5  DM 
Foreign  US-AU-EC-CN-SA  3.0 
Sri  Lanka  Hard  0.5  US-SA-CN  3.0 
Soft  US-EC-AU-AR  3.0 
Japan  High  Quality  0.5  US-CN-AU  1.0 
Low  Quality  DM-AU  1.0 
Korea  Food  0.5  US-AU-CN  1.0 
Feed  CN-EC-SA-AR  1.0 
Taiwan  Hard  0.5  US-CN  1.0 
Soft  US 
China  High  Protein  0.5  CN-US-AU-AR-SA  3.0 
Low  Protein  DM-US-EC  3.0 
The  Philippin  ••  Hard  0.5  US-CN  3.0 
Soft  US-EC-AU-SA  3.0 
Indonesia  Hard  0.5  CN-AR-SA-US  3.0 
Soft  AU-EC-US  3.0 
- = Not  applicable. 
1  Supplier  codes:  US- United States;  CN- Canada;  EC- European CODmunity;  AU- Australia;  AR- Argentina; 
. SA- Saudi Arabia;  DM- Domestic. 
9 Table  4  -- Blasticities of substitution:  other importers 
Importer  Wheat  class  Between-class  Suppliers1  Within-class 
substitution  substitution 
elasticity  elasticity 
United States  Durum  0.5  US-CN  4.0 
Non-Durum 
Hard  1.0  Winter-Spring  2.0 
Spring:  US-CN  4.0 
Soft  US 
European Community  Soft  0.5  EC 
Hard  US-CN-SA  3.0 
Mexico,  Hard  0.5  US-CN  3.0 
Central America  Soft  EC-US-AR-DM  3.0 
Other South  High  Protein  0.5  US-CN  3.0 
America  Low  Protein  DM-AR-US-EC  3.0 
Other Western  Soft  0.5  DM-EC 
Europe  Hard  US-CN-SA  3.0 
Eastern Europe  Soft  0.5  DM-EC 
Hard  US-CN-SA  3.0 
Other  North Africa  Durum  0.5  DM-CN-US-EC  4.0 
Coomon  EC-US-DM-CN  4.0 
Other Sub-Saharan  Domestic  3.0  OM 
Africa  Hard  US-CN-SA  4.0 
Soft  EC 
Other Near  East  Domestic  3.0  OM-SA 
Foreign 
Australian  1.0  AU 
Other  EC-US-CN-AR  4.0 
Other  Far East  Hard  0.5  AU-US-CN-SA  3.0 
Soft  EC-US  3.0 
Rest  of World  Generic  US-EC-AU-SA-DM  3.0 
- ~ Not  applicable. 
1 Supplier Codes:  US- United States;  CN- Canada;  EC- European Community;  AU- Australia;  AR- Argentina; 
SA- Saudi  Arabia;  DM- Domestic. 
10 Table  5  -- Export Enhancement Enhancement bonuses for u.s. wheat:  July-June marketing year 
Country/Region  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90  1990/91  1991/92  1992/93 
Dollars per metric ton 
Venezuela  1.29  13.78 
Brazil  23.21  7.55  2-8.74  35.16 
Mexico,  Central  America  12.18  10.84  2.53  1.95  4.84  1.99 
Other South America  7.17  1.88  1.86  8.47  3.66 
Other Western  Europe  12.83  2.61  .28  45.17  36.47  36.00 
Former Soviet Union  43.14  27.65  20.59  15.98  38.9  46.68  31. 00 
Eastern Europe  34.39  38.3  3.31  6.48  2.02  40.68  26.81 
Morocco  40.93  30.44  18.47  15.14  41.98  42.11  35.34 
Tunisia  24.32  33.43  5.65  45.71  41.02  35.50 
Other North Africa  32.34  32.26  19.14  13.33  37.24  51. 3  38.09 
Ghana  40.21  34.82  22.06  16.88  44.07  55.95  35.01 
Togo  40.21  34.82  22.06  16.88  44.07  55.95  35.01 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  7.15  9.41  8.41  16.57  5.75  55.95  29.52 
Egypt  30.19  21.83  13.39  4.3  33.96  55.55  27.98 
Yemen  8.98  21.42  9.94  20.24  30.89  34.38 
Sri  Lanka  33.69  31. 62  11.86  7.33  35.38  44.97  27.03 
Other Near East  15.16  12.27  9.64  3.64  15.2  7.62  16.98 
China  34.25  35.42  20.38  5.15  27.32  43.47  40.00 
Philippines  21.11  7.9  2.79  22.08  35.34  23.78 
Other  Far East  25.72  10.36  10.46  32.36 
-- =  None. 
Source:  Author's calculations for July  - June marketing year,  based  on  USDA  data. 
11 Figure  3 
Export Enhancement  program  for Wheat: 
Yearly Subsidization,  1986/87-1992/93 
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clearly will  expand,  the  effects  on  the  domestic  price  are  less 
certain.  The  stimUlation  of  export  demand  (the  "subsidy"  effect) 
puts  upward  pressure  on  the  domestic  commodity  price,  while 
deliveries into the market out of  CCC  stocks  (the  "stock release" 
effect)  depresses prices. Houck  (1986)  has shown that,  for the case 
of a  uniform export subsidy,  the elasticity of export demand plays 
a  determining role in which effect will dominate.  If export demand 
is elastic  (absolute value  greater than  unity),  then  the  subsidy 
effect will dominate and the domestic wheat price should rise, all 
else constant. 
An  additional  complication  is  introduced  through  the  commodity 
certificate program.  The certificates need not be redeemed for the 
commodity  for whose  export they were  issued.  Any  commodity  in CCc 
inventories can be  redeemed.  Therefore,  if only  a  fraction of the 
certificates issued for wheat were redeemed for wheat,  the program 
effect would begin to resemble more a  cash subsidy,  for which there 
is no  domestic price ambiguity. 
It is not  possible  to  trace  through  the  EEP  certificates because 
certificates  were  also  issued  for  in-kind  payments  of  other 
12 Government  programs.  However,  personal  contact  with  officials  of 
the  Agriculture  Stabilization  and  Conservation  service  (ASCS)  in 
Kansas City indicates that of all certificates issued over the life 
of the commodity certificate program,  25  percent were  redeemed for 
wheat.  This  proportion  is  incorporated  in  this  analysis.  When 
scenarios are run,  the total amount of reduced EEP  expenditures is 
calculated.  This  amount  is divided by the domestic  wheat  price to 
yield  the  volume  of  EEP  shipments.  Twenty-five  percent  of  this 
amount  is assumed to have been originally released from  CCC  stocks 
to  help  finance  the  program  subsidies.  with  the  modeling  of  the 
program  removal,  this  amount  is  withdrawn  back  into  CCc  stocks, 
thereby putting upward pressure on wheat prices when the program is 
removed. 
Producer Responses 
When evaluating the effects of the EEP,  we  assumed that the effects 
are  incorporated  in  the  base  data  used  to  initialize the  model. 
Modeling the  removal  of the program  identifies the effects of the 
EEP.  EEP  removal  affects  prices,  consumption,  stock  levels, 
production,  and therefore,  trade. 
How  producers are assumed to adjust to changed prices is a  problem 
stemming  from  the use  of  a  static model  for analyzing the effects 
for  a  specific year.  Most  planting decisions would  have  been  made 
on the basis of expected prices rather than actual realized prices. 
Also,  the  supply  elasticities  from  the  SWOPSIM  database  are 
typically  assumed  to  represent  medium  term  (3-year)  supply 
adjustments to changed prices. While one can formulate appropriate 
price  expectation  assumptions  under  which  the  medium-term 
elasticities are entirely appropriate for the analysis, that option 
is  not  fully  exercised  here.  Rather,  a  range  of  results  are 
reported.  At  one  extreme,  we  assumed  that there  is  no  production 
response  due  to changed prices  (supply elasticities set at zero). 
All adjustments come from changed consumption levels and changes in 
CCc  stock  levels.  At  the  other extreme,  producers  are  assumed  to 
adjust  fully  within  the  current  year  to  changed  prices  (supply 
elasticities  set  at  levels  in  table  2).  The  true  responses  are 
assumed  to  be  within  the  ranges  presented.  The  distribution  of 
"true" responses within the ranges could vary depending on whether 
an  EEP  was  assumed to exist in the previous years. 
Effect of the EEP  on u.s.  Wheat  Imports 
The subsidies shown in table 5  are assumed withdrawn from importers 
of u.s.  wheat  for  each. of the  years  1986/87  through  1992/93.  The 
effects  of  the  withdrawals  are  analyzed  through  seven  separate 
comparative static world wheat models,  each having been constructed 
to capture relevant  feat~re~ of world wheat trade for each year for 
which  analysis  is  intended.  Details  for  a  more  comprehensive 
13 evaluation of the EEP  have been presented elsewhere  (Haley,  1994). 
This analysis concentrates  on  the effect on U.S.  wheat  imports. 
Modelinq Assumptions 
There are several modeling  assumptions  made  that might affect the 
results in more than marginal ways.  The  first is the assumption of 
substitutability  between  U. S.  and  Canadian  wheats  in  the  U. S. 
Fiqure  4 







market.  As  detailed  in  table  4,  the  model  assumes  a  consumption 
structure  and  specific  substitution elasticities between  wheats. 
This  structure,  with  initial  sUbstitution  parameter  values,  is 
shown diagrammatically in figure 4.  The parameter values have only 
been  surmised  as  reasonable  approximations:  they  have  not  been 
rigorously  estimated.  Also,  the  degree  of  substitutability  may 
change  from  year-to-year  due  to,  perhaps,  weather-related  events 
that  cause  differences  in  the  intrinsic  characteristics  of  the 
wheat.  In order to assess the sensitivity of results to parameter 
values,  the values have been increased 50  percent and model  run to 
simulate  removal  of  the  EEP.  Results  are  presented  below  that 
illustrate the contribution of the substitutability assumptions to 
the analysis. 
A second assumption hypothesized as important to estimated outcomes 
is the degree to which the CWB  has reacted·to the EEP.  As  explained 
above,  it is known  that the CWB  determines its initial acquisition 
price of wheat taking into account the EEP's effect on world wheat 
prices.  The  pricing story,  however,  is not complete because it is 
not  known  explicitly  how  the  CWB  uses  export  price  discounts  to 
14 remain competitive in world markets. 
In  one  version,  the  model  is set so  that most  but  not all of the 
change to the world price of Canadian wheat is transmitted back to 
the producer.  In terms of model-mechanics,  the "price transmission 
elasticity" set to 0.85  (table 2).  Effectively,  this specification 
means that it is assumed that the CWB  passively absorbs  15  percent 
of changes  in the world price. 
In  an  alternative specification,  it is assumed  that the  CWB  uses 
export  subsidies  more  aggressively.  In  the  short-run,  (that  is, 
when  producers  are  assumed  not  to  respond  to  price  changes,  as 
explained  above)  it is  assumed  that  the  CWB  uses  uniform  export 
subsidies  to  maintain  export  volume.  In  other  words,  the  CWB 
completely offsets the effect of the  EEP  on  the  level of Canadian 
wheat exports.  Export subsidies become  a  policy tool to maintain a 
set level of exports:  if the level of exports  was  10  mmt.,  it was 
because that was  the level decided  upon  by the  CWB.  In the  longer 
term  (that  is,  when  producers  respond  to  price  changes),  it is 
assumed that uniform export subsidies are used to maintain Canadian 
world market share,  relative to the other major wheat exporters of 
the  United  states,  the  European  Union,  Australia,  Argentina,  and  ~ 
Saudi Arabia. 
Eight different versions of the model  for each year  (56,  or 8  times 
7,  in all)  are used to estimate the effect of the EEP  on U.s.  wheat 
imports  from  Canada.  Rather  than  rely  on  point  estimates  of  the 
effect,  a  range  will  be  presented.  Figure  5  summarizes  the  key 
differences between  each of the versions. 
Figure  5  -- Modeling  Assumptions 
SLbstitutabl Ilty: 
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Table  6  shows  model  estimates  of  u.s.  imports  of  Canadian  wheat 
assuming  the  removal  of  the  EEP,  all  else  constant.  Averaging 
across the 8 sets of modeling assumptions (substitutability, policy 
response,  producer  response),  the  results  imply  that total  wheat 
imports  from  Canada  for the entire time period would  have  been  35 
percent less had there been no  EEP.  Results show that EEP  probably 
had stronger relative effects in some  years.  Figure 6  shows yearly 
simulated import levels relative to the base.  As  might be expected, 
Figure  6 
Simulated Reduction in u.s.  Wheat  Imports 
Due  to EEP  Removal 
Proportion of Actual Exports 
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the  EEP's  strongest effects occurred  in  1987/88  and  1991/92,  the 
years  in which  EEP  expenditures were particularly high  (fig.  3). 
As  expected,  EEP  as  an  explainer  of  increased  imports  varies 
proportionally  with  assumptions  about  the  degree  of 
substitutability between the wheats,  the level of Canadian export 
subsidization,  and  inability  of  producers  to  respond  to  price 
changes in the short-term. The substitutability assumption seems to 
be most  important.  The differences  in total  import  levels between 
cases where only the substitutability assumption is changed  (1  and 
5,  2  and  6,  3  and  7,  4  and  8)  average  394  thousand  metric  tons, 
with little between-case variation. 
16 Table  6  -- Estimates of u.s.  Imports  of Canadian  Wheat 
LOOO  Metric Tons 
Scenario:  Moderate  High 
Subat.  Subst. 
Partial  Full Policy  Partial  Full Policy 
Policy Resp.  Resp.  Policy Resp.  Resp. 
Year  Base  Case  1:  Caae  2:  Case  3:  Case  4:  Case  5:  Case  6:  Case  7:  Case  8: 
Full Prod.  No  Prod.  Full Prod.  No  Prod.  Full Prod.  No  Prod.  Full Prod.  No  Prod. 
Reap.  to  Raap.  to  Rasp.  to  Resp.  to  Resp.  to  Resp.  to  Resp.  to  Resp.  to 
Prices  Prices  Prices  Prices  Prices  Prices  Prices  Prices 
1986/87  427  364  329  339  328  340  301  308  300 
1987/88  345  230  194  196  193  192  175  152  174 
1988/89  352  301  284  287  284  280  259  261  259 
1989/90  331  309  301  309  301  300  288  288  288 
1990/91  582  477  411  432  409  438  363  380  360 
1991/92  936  624  531  529  526  515  416  401  410 
1992/93  1369  1002  875  908  868  879  741  764  732 
Total  4342  3307  2925  3000  2909  2944  2543  2554  2523 
17 outcomes  with  respect  to  the  presumed  Canadian  policy  response 
(partial  or  full)  seem  to  depend  on  the  assumption  regarding 
producers'  ability to  respond  to  changed  prices:  average  of  350 
thousand metric tons  assuming  producers  respond  (cases  1  and  3,  5 
and  7)  but only  18  thousand metric tons otherwise  (cases  2  and  4, 
6  and  8).  One  interpretation would  be  that assumptions  regarding 
the Canadian policy export response matter only over the medium or 
longer term. 
Viewed  from  a  different  perspective,  outcomes  with  respect  to 
producers  responses  could  be  seen  to  depend  on  the  policy 
assumption.  In the partial policy  response  cases  (1  and  2,  5  and 
6),  the differences average  392  thousand metric tons.  In the full 
policy response cases  (3  and 4,7 and 8),  they are only 61 thousand 
metric  tons.  A  conclusion  might  be  that  assumptions  regarding 
producers'  capacity  to  quickly  respond  to  price  changes  matters 
mostly  in  the  situation  where  policymakers  do  not  actively 
counteract the effects of the  EEP  in world markets. 
Modeling Assumptions  and  ANOVA 
Regression  results  reported  in  Table  7  represent  an  attempt  to 
highlight the contribution of the assumptions to the results.  The  ~ 
interpretations  are  of  the  variety  associated  with  ANOVA.
1  The 
independent  variables  are  defined  as  in  the  table:  a  set  of 
indicator  variables  (values  of  0  or  1)  depending  on  whether  a 
particular assumption is being made.  For instance,  the variable AX 
is equal  to  1  in the case  of moderate  substitutability,  and  to  0 
for  the  high  substitutability  case.  Indicator  variables 
representing  interaction  effects  are  defined  as  well  for 
instance,  ABX=1  if AX=1  and  BX=I,  0  otherwise.  These variables are 
regressed on the import levels predicted by the model.  There are 56 
observations  - 7  years  times  8  cases.  The  import  levels  are 
centered  about  the  mean  for  each  case  in  order  to  negate 
differences attributable to the time dimension. 
A  number  of  equations  have  been  estimated  (although  only  two  are 
shown  here).  The  first  objective  was  to  test  for  interactions 
between  assumptions  to  see  whether  they  combine  to  influence 
modeling  results  in  statistically  significant  ways.  In  no  case 
could  any  significant  interactions  be  discerned.  From  equations 
shown  in the table,  the joint hypothesis that none of the possible 
interactions are statistically significant cannot be  rejected:  F-
statistic equals  0.24. 
Equation  2  shows  the  direct  effects  of  the  assumptions.  Of  the 
direct-effect  coefficients,  the  SUbstitution  coefficient  is  the 
lSee Neter and Wasserman  (1974),  parts 3  and 4.  The regression 
approach  described  here  is  explained  in  detail  in  their  section 
16.3 
18 Table  7  -- Effects of Assumptions  on Modeling outcomes: 
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Predicted  import  levels· 
Substitution index:  Moderate  - 1;  High  =  0; 
Policy  index:  Partial  =  1;  Full  =  0; 
Producer  response  index:  Full  =  1;  None  =  0; 
Interaction indices,  where  *  =  A,B,or  C 
Equation  1 







Degrees  of freedom: 
Rbar-squared: 
Std error of est: 
Probability of F: 
Log-Likelihood: 
Coeff  Std.  Error  t-Stat 
390.4286  32.3251  12.0782 
47.4286  45.7146  1. 0375 
2.0000  45.7146  0.0437 
0.5714  45.7146  0.0125 
-0.2857  64.6503  -0.0044 
11.7143  64.6503  0.1812 
49.8571  64.6503  0.7712 
-12.0000  91.4293  -0.1312 
Equation  2 
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•  To  obtain  Z,  predicted  import  levels  from  table  6  were  centered about  their 
respective  column  averages  in  order  to  minimize  distortions  due  to  variation 
across  time. 
19 largest  and  only  one  which  is  statistically  significant.  This 
result  implies  that  the  substitutability  assumption  is  the  most 
crucial  for modeling purposes. 
Analysis  of  Import Trend 
Table  8  presents  another  way  to  examine  the effect of  the  EEP  on 
wheat imports.  For the base and for the cases corresponding to each 
alternative  set  of  assumptions,  a  simple  time  trend  equation  is 
estimated.  The  degree  of  variance  explained  by  the  simple  trend 
estimate  (the  adjusted  R-squared)  is  around  60  percent  for  most 
cases.  In the table,  the  slope  parameter  shows  the  rate at which 
imports  have  been estimated to have  been  increasing over the time 
period.  The actual growth is estimated at about 150 thousand metric 
tons per year. 
The percentage reductions in the growth rate due to EEP  removal are 
shown  in  the  last  table  column.  They  range  from  32  percent 
(moderate substitutability, partial policy response,  full producer 
response)  to 56 percent for opposite assumptions.  From the analysis 
reported above,  the SUbstitution assumption is the most  important. 
The  average  growth rate for the  4  cases corresponding to moderate  ~ 
substitutability is 91 thousand metric tons,  a  40 percent reduction 
from  the  actual  rate.  The  average  growth  rate  for  the  higher 
substitutability cases  is  73  thousand  metric  tons,  a  48  percent 
reduction. 
u.s.  Imports of Canadian Wheat  in 1991/92 
As  shown  in figure  6,  wheat  imports in 1991/92 attributable to EEP 
effects  were  higher  than  the  average.  As  there  noted,  EEP  wheat 
volume  and  expenditure  were  high  that  year,  suggesting  a 
relationship  with  the  u.s.  wheat  import  level.  However,  it  is 
hypothesized  that  a  switch  in  the  type  of  wheat  demanded  by 
importers  that  may  accompany  an  increase  in  import  demand  may 
introduce  an  additional  channel  through  which  u.s.  wheat  imports 
could be affected by the EEP.  This effect arises because the United 
states can  supply several types of wheat to importers. 
Further analysis of  EEP  targeting and  levels of wheat  demanded  in 
Chinese  and  Brazilian  markets  from  the  united  states  and  Canada 
illustrates the  effect.  Figure  7  shows  the  sum  of  Brazilian  and 
Chinese  wheat  imports  from  Canada  and  the  United  states.  In 
addition to the  rise in overall  wheat  demand,  the  figure  shows  a 
reorientation from soft wheat to hard wheat in 1991/92.  This switch 
is  important  because  U. S •  hard  and  Canadian  wheats  are  close 
SUbstitutes in both markets,  meaning that EEP  subsidies would have 
had  a  larger  displacement  effect  with  respect  to  the  level  of 
Canadian  imports  in those markets. 
Three  modeling  experiments  were  performed.  In  the  first,  EEP 
20 Table  8  -- Regression Results 
Scenario  Parameter  Adjusted  Percent 
Estimates:  R2  Reduction  in 
Constant"  Slope  Slope Coefficient 
from  Base 
Base  14.86  151. 36  62.7 
(240.44)  (34.55) 
Moderate 
SubstitutabilitI 
Partial Canadian Policy 
Response: 
Full Producer Response  61.29  102.79  62.5  32% 
(163.86)  (30.97) 
No  Producer Response  69.43  87.11  61. 9  42% 
(140.68)  (26.59) 
Full Canadian  Policy 
Response: 
Full Producer Response  68.86  89.93  60.8  41% 
(148.30)  (28.03) 
No  Producer Response  71.14  86.11  61. 8  43% 
(139.26)  (26.32) 
HiSb  §ybstitutabilitI 
Partial Canadian  Policy 
Response: 
Full Producer Response  74.71  86.46  60.4  43% 
(143.58)  (27.13 ) 
No  Producer Response  91. 00  68.07  57.3  55% 
(119.65)  (22.61) 
Full Canadian  Policy 
Response: 
Full Producer Response  81.29  70.89  54.7  53% 
(130.66)  (24.69) 
No  Producer Response  93.43  66.75  57.0  56% 
(118.07)  (22.31) 
..  Standard error of coefficient estimate  in parenthesis below coeffiCient. 
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subsidies to the  Chinese  and  Brazilians are  reduced  to  zero,  but 
EEP  subsidies  to  all  other  subsidy  recipients  are  increased  to 
leave the total EEP  expenditure constant.  The result is referred to 
as the "pure target effect." In the second,  EEP  subsidies to China 
and  Brazil  are  reduced to  zero  and  EEP  expenditure  is reduced  by 
that  amount.  This  result is called the  "mixed  target effect."  In 
the third, all EEP  subsidies are removed.  This result is called the 
"total  effect."  Results  are  shown  in  table  9.  In  addition  to 
1991/92,  results  for  1992/93  are  shown  in  order  to  provide  a 
contrast. 
The  "pure  target"  case  for  1991/92  predicts  a  reduction  of  u.s. 
imports  of  Canadian  wheat  of  139  thousand  metric  tons,  or  45 
. percent  of  the  "total  effect"  of  312  thousand  metric  tons.  The 
"mixed target"  case is 177  thousand metric tons,  or  57  percent of 
the "total." As  a  contrast,  1992/93 Chinese and Brazilian demand is 
much lower although the ratio of demand between hard and soft wheat 
is  similar.  Corresponding  percentages  are:  27  percent  for  the 
"pure"  effect and  34  percent for the  "mixed." 
22 Table  9  -- Targeted  EEP  Subsidies  and  U.S.  Wheat  Imports 
Terms:  Pure Target Effect -- Eliminate  EEP  subsidies to China  and  Brazil,  but do  not  reduce overall 
EEP  expenditure level. 
Mixed Target Effect -- Eliminate EEP  subsidies to China and Brazil,  and  reduce EEP  expenditure 
level by  an  amount  equal to  the  targeted subsidies. 
Total Effect -- Elimination of EEP  subsidies  to all importers  of U.S.  wheat. 
Results  Below Report  in Units  of  1000  Metric  Tons 
Reduction  in U.S.  Expansion of 
Exports  to China  Canadian Exports  to 
and Brazil  China  and  Brazil 
1991/92 
Pure  Target Effect  3238  2928 
Mixed  Target Effect  3134  2785 
Total Effect  2677  2184 
1992/93 
Pure  Target Effect  1286  1131 
Mixed  Target Effect  1271  1103 
Total Effect  1101  832 
These  experiments 
shared markets  can 
level of aggregate 
imply  that  competition  of 
cause  a  displacement effect 
EEP  spending. 
Effect of a  Quota 
Reduction  in  U.S. 








similar  wheats  in 
independent of the 
In July 1994  the ITC decided that high levels of  imported Canadian 
wheat  had  materially  interfered  with  the  operations  of  the  u.s. 
wheat  income and price support program.  Canada subsequently agreed 
to restrict wheat shipments to the united States. 2  Most of the  ITC 
concern centered on  a  hypothesized wheat price decrease due to the 
presence  of  excessive  supplies  of  imported  wheat.  Lower-than-
2Up  to 300 thousand metric tons of durum wheat and up to 1,050 
thousand metric tons of other wheat can enter the United states at 
the  tariff  rate  set  under  the  terms  of  the  North  American  Free 
Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)  ..  For  durum  imports  between  300  and  450 
thousand  metric  tons,  the  tariff  rate  is  $23  per  ton.  For 
additional  imports  of  durum  (above  450  thousand)  and  other wheat 
(above  1,050  thousand),  the  tariff  rate  is  $50  per  ton.  For 
additional details,  see USDA  Press  release no.  0727.94. 
23 justified wheat prices caused a  widening of the deficiency payment 
rate  and  therefore  cost  u. S.  taxpayers  millions  of  dollars  in 
additional  payments to u.s.  wheat  producers.3 
Theoretical  Expectations 
If the united States were to restrict imports of Canadian wheat,  a 
proportion of that wheat would surely find its way  to other markets 
served by  Canada.  Because the United states and  Canada  compete'in 
an  interconnected  world  market  for  wheat,  it is  likely that  the 
Canadian  wheat  would  displace  u.s.  wheat  in  third  markets.  This 
effect,  by  itself,  would  depress  u.s.  wheat  prices.  The  dual  of 
this international displacement is the expanded sales opportunities 
for U.S.  producers  in the u.s.  domestic market.  These sales would 
lead to price increases for u.s. wheats.  The overall effect on u.s. 
wheat prices would therefore depend on the relative sizes of these 
two effects. 
Figure  8  -
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Figure 8  illustrates the effects. The left panel shows the domestic 
supply and demand  schedules  (S  and 0,  respectively)  for u.s.  wheat 
as  a  functions  of  the  U. S .  price.  The  right  panel  shows  the 
international  market  for  u.s.  wheat.  Larger  quantities  of  wheat 
3The  EEP  was  not taken  into account  in the  lTC's  decision  on 
material interference because the EEP  is not part of the U. s. wheat 
program. 
24 supplied than what is demanded  domestically are  shown  as the u.s. 
excess  supply  (ES)  schedule.  Initial equilibrium exports  (Qi)  and 
price  (Pt>  are  shown  where  excess  demand  for  U. S.  wheat, 
represented as the  ED  schedule,  meets  excess  supply. 
The  direct  effect  of  the  quota  on  wheat  imports  from  Canada  is 
shown  as an  increase in demand  for u.s.  wheat  (movement  of D to D' 
in  the  left  panel)  and,  correspondingly,  reduced  excess  supply 
available for the international market  (ES  to ES').  Export  levels 
decrease  from  Qi  to  Qu,  and  the  export  price  increases  to  Pu  in 
order to  ration export  demand.  Canadian  wheat  displaced  from  the 
U.S.  market would  presumably  find its way  to alternative markets. 
If U.S.  and Canadian wheats were not substitutable internationally, 
these direct effects would  be the final  ones. 
If  U.S.  and  Canadian  wheats  were  sUbstitutable  internationally, 
Canadian  wheat  displaced  from  the  United  states  would  in  turn 
displace u.s. wheat from international markets.  In the right panel, 
the excess  demand  for u.s.  wheat  would shift leftward to ED'.  The 
magnitude  of  the  shift  would  depend  on  the  magnitude  of  the 
substitutability. A high degree of substitutability is shown in the 
panel:  ED  shifts  sufficiently  leftward  to  more  than  offset  the 
initial  upward  price  movement:  the  price  decreases  below  the  # 
initial  equilibrium  price  as  exports  decrease  to  Qf.  The  lower 
price limit would  be at P1  where  no  domestic substitutability  (and 
hence  no  leftward movement  of  ES)  is assumed. 
Estimate of Quota Effect 
The models already used in this paper for analysis can be used for 
an examination of this issue.  The analysis is assumed to cover the 
medium-term:  producers  are  assumed  to  adjust  to  predicted  price 
changes.  For this particular experiment,  the model  for the 1992/93 
year  is  used  because  it  is  the  latest  year  capable  of  being 
analyzed.  The  specific  scenario  is  one  in  which  imports  are 
restricted to  1989/90  levels.  As  can  be  seen  in  table  6,  actual 
imports  for  1992/93  were  1,369  thousand metric tons,  and  were  331 
thousand metric tons in 1989/90.  The  implied reduction,  therefore, 
is 1,038 thousand metric tons. 
Three  Canadian  policy  responses  are  modeled.  The  first  is  the 
partial adjustment to world prices,  as used above.  The  second  and 
third have the Canadians  using explicit uniform export subsidies. 
In the second,  the goal is to maintain 1992/93 export market share 
relative to the other major wheat exporters.  In the third,  the goal 
is to maintain export volume at constant levels.  Results on export 
volumes  and prices are  shown  in table 10. 
Predicted decreases  in u.s.  export volumes  are fairly small: 
25 Table 10 -- Price and Trade Effects of o.s. Quota on Canadian Wheat 
Cases  Canadian  Policy Response  to U.S.  Quota: 
none  (i) 
(ii) 
( iii) 
increase subsidy to maintain world market  share 
increase subsidy to maintain export volume 
Change  in: 
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between  0.3  and  0.5  percent.  Corresponding  U. S.  export  price 
decreases  range between  $0.69  and  $1.04  per metric  ton.  With  the 
U.S.  price transmission elasticity set to  one,  domestic  producer 
and  consumer prices are  assumed to change  by these  same  amounts. 
Because  the  U.S.  wheat  price  decreases,  the  implication  is that 
restriction  of  Canadian  imports  would  serve  to  increase  wheat 
program  costs  rather than decrease  them.  This  result is directly 
contrary to the basis  upon  which  the  recent  ITC  ruling was  made, 
that is, that increased Canadian imports have increased the cost of 
U.S.  wheat program by  lowering the prices of U.S.  wheat upon which 
deficiency payments  are calculated. 
Alternative Approach 
It  is  possible  to  generate  results  that  could  support  the  ITC 
decision.  The  mechanism  is based  on  the  assumption  that  Canadian 
imports  forced the diversion of U.S.  wheat  away  from  its highest-
valued domestic use into less-desirable export markets.  In order to 
obtain a  U.S.  price increase resulting from the import restriction, 
it must  be  assumed  that  Canadian  wheat  withdrawn  from  the united 
26 states does  not  to enter  into  alternate marketing  channels;  that 
is, it is effectively destroyed or perhaps used for  feed.  In terms 
of  figure  8,  ES  shifts leftward to ES',  but there is no  change  in 
ED. 
As  an  experiment,  u. s.  production  and  consumption  levels  were 
exogenously set at the solution levels of case  1  above.  The  model 
was solved for export prices that would clear all markets.  In these 
instances,  the u.s. wheat prices would have to increase in order to 
reduce the level of excess demand  for u.s.  wheat in import markets 
to  match  the  fixed  level  of  excess  supply.  The  necessary  price 
increase was  calculated to be  $0.40 per metric ton.  Therefore,  if 
one  were willing to accept the premise of this analysis  (that is, 
no  non-U. s.  demand  for  the  withdrawn  wheat),  then  U. s.  wheat 
program costs could have  increased due  to the  imports. 
conclusions 
Increasing yearly U.s.  imports of Canadian wheat have been a  major 
concern  of U.S.  wheat  interests.  Given  the  recent  ITC  ruling  and 
trade  negotiations with  Canada,  wheat  imports  will  now  be  lower,  # 
for at least one year. This paper has presented analysis concerning 
the  effect of  EEP  on  the  level  of  imports  and  the  effect that  a 
quota might have on U.s.  wheat exports and prices. It uses a  set of 
world  wheat  models  that  explicitly  incorporate  product 
differentiation among  wheat  classes and  source countries. 
Three sets of conclusions  emerge  from this analysis: 
o  Over the period 1986-1993,  EEP  has been accountable for  40  to 
48  percent  of  the yearly  growth  in U.s.  imports  of  Canadian 
wheat.  The  greater is the  presumed  substitutability  between 
U.s.  and Canadian wheat,  the higher is the attribution of the 
growth to the EEP. 
o  The effect of the EEP  was strong in the 1991/92 July-June crop 
year.  In particular,  EEP  subsidies to China and Brazil caused 
significant diversion of Canadian wheat  that would  have  been 
destined for those markets  instead to the U.s.  market. 
o  Restriction  of  U. S.  imports  of  Canadian  wheat  to  1989/90 
levels for the 1992/93 July-June crop year would not have had 
price-enhancing  effects  for  U. S.  wheat.  On  the  contrary, 
diversion of the Canadian wheat to third countries would have 
had induced sales away from the united States, thereby causing 
u.s. wheat exports to decline and reducing the export price of 
u.s. wheat.  If it is assumed that the Canadians increase their 
subsidies to maintain the same export volume,  wheat prices in 
the united states are  calculated to fall  by  at least  $1  per 
metric ton  (or 2.7  cents per bushel).  An  implication is that 
wheat imports from Canada have not had a  deleterious effect on 
27 the operation of U.S.  wheat  income and price support program. 
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